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Abstract. Attack trees are a popular model for security scenario anal-
ysis. Yet, they are currently treated in the literature as a static model
and are not suitable for dynamic security monitoring. In this paper we
introduce attack-tree series, a time-indexed set of attack trees, as a model
to capture and visualize the evolution of security scenarios. This model
supports changes in the attack tree structure as well as changes in the
data values. We introduce the notion of a temperature function as a spe-
cial type of attribute that expresses the importance of change in the data
values. We also introduce a consistency predicate on attack trees to allow
inter-relating the evolving scenarios captured as attack trees. Finally, we
discuss various application scenarios for attack-tree series and we demon-
strate on a case study how the proposed ideas can be implemented to
visualize historical trends.
1 Introduction
Today, organizations face unprecedented diﬃculties to stay secure. Cyber-weaponry
becomes more and more commoditized, new vulnerabilities are reported every
day, and attack surfaces become ever more complex and interdependent. To win
this game against cyber-adversaries, security oﬃcers and analysts need to be
able to access threat data over time, allowing them to pick up relevant trends
and to proactively upgrade security [34].
Useful threat data can come in quantitative or descriptive formats. Frequency
of attacks, cost of exploit kits, and number of lost data records are examples of
the former category, while malicious IP addresses, indicators of a new adversary,
recent zero-day attacks are examples of the latter one. Access to the latest threat
data can be arranged, e.g., via subscriptions to threat feeds and monitoring of
the relevant media channels [22,34]. Generally, organizations also collect a lot
of threat data internally, from a security information and event management
(SIEM) system.
All these threat data types and sources are highly dynamic, but not all threat
modelling and analysis techniques applied in organizations are able to accom-
modate analysis of such data over time.
In particular, in this paper we focus on attack trees. Also known as threat
trees, they are a popular modelling notation for expressing security threat sce-
narios. Attack trees are widely applied in organizations to capture anticipated
attack scenarios [31,25,13], to facilitate brainstorming [6], and to estimate dif-
ferent aspects of the considered threats via quantitative analysis [3,17].
Yet, existing attack tree design methodologies and quantitative analysis (QA)
techniques focus exclusively on static scenarios, in which each tree node and data
value is ﬁxed. There is no systematic way to detect trends in dynamic security
scenarios on attack trees or to visualize the evolution of the security posture
with respect to the considered threat model. This is an unfortunate omission.
Indeed, an organization may have access to very relevant threat data over time,
but it does not have a way to systematically link this valuable data to the attack
tree model.
We argue that there is a case for enhancing attack trees for dynamic, evolv-
ing scenarios. In this position paper, we propose an approach to systematically
capture the dynamic nature of both facets of the threat data, quantitative and
descriptive, in an attack tree. We make the notion of time explicit in the deﬁni-
tion of attack trees by developing an idea of attack-tree series that are not static
but accommodate a sequence of attack trees.
We develop the ﬁrst formalization of attack-tree series (ATSs) in this paper.
In our formalization, we allow quantitative threat data values assigned to tree
nodes to change over time. We also propose to capture the importance of the
change as a temperature function that enables analysis and monitoring of histor-
ical trends. Our methodology supports scenarios in which not only the data, but
also the attack tree itself evolves over time. This allows for a dynamic descrip-
tion of the various threats and their relations. In order to develop a consolidated
view on an evolving series of attack trees, we introduce the notion of consistency.
Consistency of a series of attack trees makes it possible to relate the data values
attributed to the nodes of the various attack trees to each other.
To better highlight the applicability of the new attack-tree series, we also
discuss potential use cases for them and demonstrate their usefulness for high-
lighting historic trends with an attack tree capturing automated teller machines
fraud.
2 Related work
In short, an attack tree represents a collection of attack scenarios. The main
goal of the adversary common to all these attacks is represented by the root of
this tree. The root is iteratively reﬁned into more detailed attack components.
The reﬁnement process uses well-deﬁned decomposition operators, typically OR
and AND, and it continues until the analysts are satisﬁed that the nodes at the
lowest level are atomic attack steps. These unreﬁned nodes are called leaves of
the tree.
Attack trees have been introduced by Amoroso [2] and Salter, Saydjari,
Schneier and Wallner [30], and formalized by Mauw and Oostdijk [23]. The basic
attack tree model has been further extended into attack-defense trees [16] and
attack-countermeasure trees [29] that both feature nodes representing security
controls.
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There exist several approaches to design an attack tree. An expert, or a
group of experts, may design a tree manually, by analytically and iteratively
considering all relevant attack developments. This is the traditional approach in
the threat modelling literature [31,32]. The manual work may be facilitated by
relevant knowledge, e.g., from industry-speciﬁc catalogues of threats or threat
ontologies [6]. Recently, automated and assisted attack tree generation tech-
niques have emerged [14,35,27,11,15]. However, all these approaches work with
static scenarios, and they do not take into account potential evolution in the
considered threat structure.
The most popular quantitative analysis technique for attack trees is the
bottom-up computation approach, in which leaf nodes are assigned values rep-
resenting attributes (e.g., cost or probability of the corresponding atomic attack
step). These values are then propagated bottom-up using the attribute rules for
the corresponding decomposition operator [23,31]. Various attributes that can
be computed on an attack tree with the bottom-up computation approach are
proposed by Bagnato et al. [3] and Kordy et al [17]. For example, one can esti-
mate probability of a particular threat, cost of an attack for the adversary or for
the defender, satisﬁability of attacks, time till successful attack, and many other
parameters [3,17]. These quantitative analysis techniques are used, for instance,
to perform security risk analysis [26,19] and to make decisions about security
investments [9]. There exist other QA techniques for attack trees, usually in-
volving the transformation of an attack tree into another model, e.g., timed
automata [19,8].
As we mentioned, existing QA approaches for attack trees work with static
data values. Currently, if an organization wants to explore trends in the data
values used in an attack tree, it needs to decouple visualization of security data
values from the attack tree, for example, in a separate dashboard. Yet, this
solution neglects the analyst's intuition behind the attack tree design, and could
possibly hinder the detection of higher-level trends.
To the best of our knowledge, there are only few works studying attack tree
visualizations. ADTool [18,10] and SecurITree [1] are tools for manual design and
quantitative analysis of attack trees, but they do not oﬀer extensive visualization
capabilities besides showing static attack trees. Li et al. [21] have developed an
approach to visualize complex scenarios with attack trees. Their work focuses on
very large attack trees, helping the analyst to quickly identify interesting areas
(e.g., the most probable attack scenarios) by highlighting them visually. Yet, this
technique has been developed for static scenarios. It is thus the goal of our work
to introduce an approach to model dynamic security scenarios with attack trees
and to perform quantitative analysis of such scenarios.
Outside the attack tree literature, security visualization is a well-developed
research area, and dynamic data visualisation techniques for security risks and
attacks have been studied in, e.g., [20,33,24,28,12]. These studies on cyberse-
curity visualisation, as well as Li et al. [21], agree on the need to support the
analyst by directing their attention to the important areas in the model. In the
next section we outline our proposal for modelling dynamic scenarios with attack
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trees enhanced with a novel type of attributes that capture the importance of
data dynamics.
3 Attributes on attack-tree series
In this section we formally deﬁne an attack-tree series as a sequence of time-
indexed attack trees. We also deﬁne the valuation of an attribute on an attack-
tree series and consider a speciﬁc type of attribute, which we call temperature.
Because the proposed extension is independent of the chosen attack tree seman-
tics, we will provide an intuitive interpretation only.
3.1 Attack-tree series
We consider attack trees constructed from leaf nodes and two types of internal
nodes (AND and OR). Following, e.g., [5], we will assume that all nodes of the
attack tree are labeled.
Deﬁnition 1 (Attack tree). Let L be a set of labels. An attack tree is an
expression generated by the following grammar (for ` ∈ L):
t ::= ` | OR(t, . . . , t)` | AND(t, . . . , t)`.
We say that an attack tree has unique labels, if all labels occur at most once
in that attack tree. In this paper we will only consider attack trees that have
unique labels. By labels(t) we denote the set of labels occurring in attack tree t.
An attack-tree series describes the evolution of an attack tree over time. In
order to have a consistent view on the development of the individual nodes in
the attack tree, we will deﬁne a consistency property.
Deﬁnition 2 (Consistent trees). We say that two attack trees t and t′ are
consistent if the following three conditions are fulﬁlled:
1. The root nodes of t and t′ have the same label.
2. If two non-root nodes of t and t′ have the same label l1, then their parent
nodes must have the same label l2.
3. If two non-leaf nodes of t and t′ have the same label l1, then they must have
the same type (i.e. OR, resp. AND).
A sequence (or set) of attack trees is consistent if all its constituent attack trees
are pairwise consistent.
This notion of consistency guarantees that labels occurring in multiple in-
carnations of a developing attack tree always relate to the same node of the
tree. Formulated diﬀerently, assume that we have two attack trees t and t′ of
which the root nodes have the same label, and assume that the intersection of
the labels of these trees is L, then the subtree of t with labels from L is identical
to the subtree of t′ with labels from L.
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Deﬁnition 3 (Attack-tree series). Let ∆ be a discrete time domain. An
attack-tree series (tδ)δ∈∆ is a consistent sequence of attack trees indexed over
∆.
An example of a consistent attack-tree series is shown in Fig. 1. Ignoring the
attributes and temperature function (i.e. the numbers and colours), this ﬁgure
shows an evolving attack tree at time points δ = 1, . . . , 5. Each attack tree in
the series contains unique labels. It is easy to verify that every pair of attack
trees in this series is consistent. For instance, the ﬁrst two trees in the series are
consistent because (1) their root nodes have the same label a, (2) corresponding
non-root nodes in the two trees have parents with the same label (the parent
of b in both trees is a), and (3) all non-leaf nodes with the same label have the
same type (e.g. a is an OR node in both trees).
This ﬁgure also illustrates the rationale behind restricting Condition 3 in
Deﬁnition 2 to non-leaf nodes. The reason for this restriction is that during the
evolution of an attack tree an analyst may recognize substructure in an attack
step that was ﬁrst considered atomic. In the attack tree, this would mean that
the node representing the atomic attack step evolves from a leaf node into an
internal node of type OR or AND. As we want to relate the original leaf node to
the new internal node, we only require corresponding types for non-leaf nodes,
as expressed in Condition 3. This is illustrated by the ﬁrst two attack trees in

















































Fig. 1. An attack-tree series. The numbers indicate attribute γ and colours indicate
temperature function τ .
3.2 Attributes
An attribute is an abstract notion expressing a property of interest concern-
ing the attack tree or its nodes, such as cost of attack [31]. Given an attack-
tree series (tδ)δ∈∆, an attribute is represented by a series of valuation functions
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αδ : labels(tδ)→ Dα for each time point δ ∈ ∆. The set Dα determines the range
of values that can be taken by the attribute. We don't require that a valuation
is a total function, thus allowing for valuations deﬁned on a subset of a tree's
nodes, such as the leaves.
There are various ways to determine the values of an attribute. Attributes
can, for instance, be determined through observing events or by expert's opin-
ions. Alternatively, an attribute can be completely determined by other at-
tributes at the same time point. We call such an attribute a derived attribute.
For instance, if we have an attribute direct damage and an attribute reputation
damage, then the sum of these two deﬁnes the derived attribute total damage.
If, for any time point δ0, an attribute depends on the values of other attributes
for time points δ ≤ δ0 then we say that this attribute is history-dependent. By
restricting this to a ﬁxed preﬁx of δ0 with size n, we deﬁne the subclass of n-
history-dependent attributes. The class of derived attributes then corresponds
to 0-history-dependent attributes.
For the temporal analysis of an attack-tree series we introduce the notion
of temperature. Let Γ be a ﬁnite and totally ordered set, called the temperature
domain. A temperature is a history-dependent attribute with range Γ . The in-
tuition behind this notion is that nodes with a high temperature indicate that
they are of interest to an analyst observing the development of the attack tree
over time. Consider, for instance, an attribute γ counting the observed number
of occurrences of an attack, then the diﬀerence between the current and previous
value of γ could be used to highlight an increasing prevalence of a certain at-
tack type. A relevant temperature in this case would be the 1-history dependent
attribute τ deﬁned by τδ(`) = γδ(`)− γδ−1(`)
Following these deﬁnitions, we can now deﬁne the challenge of a time-dependent
analysis of a developing attack tree. Given an attack-tree series (tδ)δ∈∆, the
challenge is to design one or more temperature attributes that relate to relevant
security aspects of the system modeled by the attack-tree sequence, allowing the
analyst to quickly observe security-related developments.
For an example of an attribute and a temperature function, we consider again
Fig. 1. The attribute γ is deﬁned through the values attributed to the nodes,
e.g. γ3(a) = 12. This particular attribute satisﬁes the property that conjunctive
reﬁnement is interpreted by the min function, while disjunctive reﬁnement is
interpreted by the sum function, e.g. γ3(a) = γ3(b)+γ3(c)+γ3(d) = 2+2+8 = 12.
We use colours of varying intensity to display the temperature values. The
temperature attribute τδ : {a, b, c, d, e, f} → {High,Medium,Low} is deﬁned by
τδ(`) =

High if γδ−1 is deﬁned and γδ(`)− γδ−1(`) ∈ [10,∞),
Medium if γδ−1 is deﬁned and γδ(`)− γδ−1(`) ∈ [5, 10),
Low otherwise.
The same attack-tree series with a diﬀerent temperature attribute is shown
in Fig. 2. The temperature attribute used in this case is 0-history dependent.
It simply splits up the range of γ into four intervals. The advantage of the
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previously deﬁned temperature function τ over τ ′ is that it only triggers if there
is a sudden increase of γ.
τ ′δ(`) =

Very high if γδ(`) ∈ [15,∞),
High if γδ(`) ∈ [10, 15),



















































Fig. 2. An attack-tree series with the same attribute γ and a diﬀerent temperature
function τ ′.
4 Usage scenarios
In this section we discuss application scenarios for attack-tree series.
4.1 Highlighting historical trends
The most straightforward usage scenario for the proposed model is to spot and
highlight trends using historical data. Our approach allows analysts to consis-
tently visualize changes in the data values on an evolving set of attack scenarios
expressed in an attack-tree series. Particularly, the analyst may choose a tem-
perature function that expresses how important a change in some data values
is, by highlighting more drastic ﬂuctuations. We demonstrate how this may be
displayed in an intuitive manner using a small case study.
Case study description. We use part of the realistic attack tree from [7]. This
attack tree captures diﬀerent scenarios in automatic teller machines (ATMs).
For our case study, we focus on the ATM fraud scenario. This part of the attack
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tree contains 20 nodes. For the sake of simplicity, we limit this case study to
dynamic data values, and we do not consider evolution of the tree structure.
We assume a company performing risk assessment for the ATM fraud scenario
is interested in historical trends for three attributes: probability, impact (mon-
etary loss) and risk, where risk is a derived attribute computed as the product
probability × impact. The company uses historical data to evaluate these at-
tributes. Probability of an attack can be evaluated from the frequency of such
attacks over a given period of time, e.g.:
Pr(attack) ≈ frequency(attack)/total number of ATMs
While frequency is an imperfect estimator, it expresses well historical trends,
i.e., with an increased frequency of an attack, its probability also goes up, and
vice-versa.
Impact of an attack is estimated as the maximal direct monetary loss stem-
ming from this attack. To compute average impact over a year, the company
sums the total amount of losses and then divides it by the number of attacks.
Historical losses can vary over the years due to many factors, for example, the
extent of an attack, purchased insurance, or a change in legislation.
The data for the ATM scenario can be acquired from industry-related cata-
logues. For example, the European Association for Secure Transactions (EAST)
regularly shares with its members extended statistics on ATM attacks and in-
curred losses1. We have used historical data from the ATM Crime Report 2015,
where we have found statistics on ATM fraud attacks in the period 20102015 in
a selected European area. Since the attack tree we use is not fully mapped to the
ATM Crime Report data, we only have statistics about frequencies and losses
for 5 attack tree nodes out of 20: ATM fraud, cash trapping, transaction
reversal, card trapping, and card skimming. We visualize historical trends
on real data only for these nodes.
We show a simple 1-history dependent temperature function τ ′′ (where om(x)
denotes order of magnitude of x):
τ ′′δ (`) =

High if γδ−1 is deﬁned and γδ(`)− γδ−1(`) ∈ [3om(γδ−1(`)),∞),
Medium if γδ−1 is deﬁned and γδ(`)− γδ−1(`) ∈ [om(γδ−1(`)), 3om(γδ−1(`))),
Low if γδ−1 is undeﬁned or γδ(`)− γδ−1(`) ∈ [−om(γδ−1(`)), om(γδ−1(`))),
Very low if γδ−1 is deﬁned and γδ(`)− γδ−1(`) ∈ [−∞,−om(γδ−1(`))).
This temperature function works for both probability and risk attributes. An
animated demo of our visualisation approach is available online in our github
repository2.
Fig. 3 shows a snapshot of our ATM fraud visualization with temperature
function τ ′′ for the risk attribute in 20122013. It visualizes that the risk of card
skimming, while being the most important contributor to the overall ATM fraud
1 https://www.association-secure-transactions.eu/tag/atm-crime-report/





Access ATM to prepare attack Execute attacks on ATM




Get PIN Get card
Shouldersurf Installing camera Install EPP Card skimming
115.5
Take card physically Social engineering card owner
Install skimmer Clone card Steal card Card trapping
11.67
Fig. 3. A snapshot of the ATM fraud attack tree visualization on real data in 2013, with
the temperature function τ ′′ for the risk attribute. The high value of the temperature
function is shown in red, the medium value is shown in yellow, and the very low value
is shown in green. The low values corresponding to very small changes in the attribute
are shown as white nodes. We mark nodes for which we do not have data in grey.
risk, did not change much from the previous year. Risk of cash trapping has
noticeably decreased in 2013, while risk of card trapping has increased. Finally,
risk of transaction reversal has increased drastically from the previous year.
Due to the lack of complete historical data, we make another visualization
using synthetic random data assigned to leaf nodes. By applying the bottom-
up computation approach we complete the decoration process and obtain data
for all intermediary nodes. For each year, for the probability values we generate
random values in [0,1], and for the impact values we generate random integers in
appropriate intervals (from [0, 100] for losses from shoulder-surﬁng, to [0, 10000]
for losses from attacks involving damaging the ATM, such as installing skimmers
and trappers). Then we apply the appropriate bottom-up computation rules for
the probability and maximal cost to the defender attributes [17] to fully decorate
the attack tree. Finally, we multiply each probability and impact data point to
compute risk, and we visualize the trends on all attack tree nodes using the
temperature function above. Animated visualizations with synthetic data are
available online at our github repository.
The analyst looking at our visualization of historical trends for the ATM
fraud scenario is able to identify the areas where the risk ﬂuctuations are con-
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centrated and review whether new countermeasures would be appropriate. How-
ever, this scenario also underlines the challenge to create informative temper-
ature functions. Temperature function τ ′′ focuses on changes in a single node
value. Thus, it may bring analyst attention to nodes where individual values
change signiﬁcantly, but they do not correspond to a major contribution to the
value at the root node. In our example with the ATM Crime Report data, risk
values at the transaction reversal node change considerably, due to the fact
that it is a rare attack and it does not appear in the logs every year. Still, this
attack is also not expensive for the ATM owner, as the risk value shows. The
analyst may not want to investigate this type of attack, as it does not contribute
signiﬁcantly to the overall risk. Therefore, they may want to design a diﬀerent
temperature function, e.g., commesurable to the overall attribute value at the
root node.
4.2 Other application scenarios
Spotting emerging trends. The visualization approach presented in the previous
subsection can be integrated in a security dashboard to enable quick identiﬁ-
cation of emerging trends. For example, if the probability of a certain attack
scenario goes up, the corresponding area in the attack tree will be highlighted,
commanding attention of the security manager. This notiﬁcation will highlight
the emerging threat in its context (related attacks that may be enabled by the
aﬀected scenario).
Forecasting and trend extrapolation. Time-series data analysis is widely used
to forecast future trends and extrapolate the ongoing dynamics [4]. Thus, our
attack tree model naturally supports these usage scenarios for suitable data
attributes. For instance, an organization may want to forecast, with regression
techniques, how frequencies of social engineering attacks will change given the
projected personnel growth rate. It may also want to extrapolate frequencies of
probing attacks or cost of certain attack steps (e.g., cost of exploits or number
of vulnerabilities in a software suite) given the dynamics observed locally or
acquired from threat intelligence feeds.
What-if analysis. The proposed attack tree model lends itself very well to what-if
analysis. For instance, the analyst may evaluate potential consequences of a risk
management decision to avoid or accept some attack scenarios (by removing or,
respectively, adding/keeping some branches of the tree). Our consistency notion
allows to investigate these planned scenarios and perform quantitative analysis
in a coherent manner.
The analyst may also consider advanced scenarios when many data values are
modiﬁed simultaneously or in sequence. For example, they can simulate several
possible attack data dynamics (cost of certain attack steps goes down or stays the
same), evaluating how resilient the company is to adverse event developments.
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Security investment analysis. Last but not least, one of the main goals of security
risk assessment and threat modelling is to identify missing security controls and
prioritize security investments. The temperature function applied to attack-tree
series visualization focuses the analyst's attention on critical attack steps or
areas of the attack tree that are aﬀected by the data dynamics. The analyst may
elaborate from this visualization the right abstraction or system level where
defences need to be positioned. They may also modify the data values in the
what-if analysis fashion to investigate whether reducing probability or aﬀecting
cost of an attack via positioning a security control strategically would reduce
the risk to the desired level. Additionally, if a company wants to purchase cyber-
insurance, defender's costs may be projected considering the envisaged premiums
that will depend on the company size and assets involved.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have developed the notion of attack-tree series that enable mod-
eling, visualization and analysis of dynamic scenarios with attack trees. We have
also deﬁned the notion of temperature functions as a special type of quantitative
attributes that capture the importance of changes in the data values. We have
visualized these ideas on a case study with the ATM fraud attack tree.
This preliminary work extends the theory of attack trees towards the de-
mands of security data analysis and visualization. We plan to extend it in sev-
eral directions. Firstly, we will further develop the theory of attack-tree series
and temperature functions for attack-defense trees, thereby explicitly integrating
security controls and facilitating security investment analysis.
In our current development, a temperature function is a history-dependent
attribute, meaning that it is based on the history of values of an attribute. This
works well if the snapshots are taken at regular intervals. However, if the time
elapsed between the various snapshots of an attack-tree series is not constant, the
temperature function may give a distorted result. Therefore, a straightforward
generalisation would be to allow the temperature function to not only depend
on the previous attack trees, but also on their time points.
As exempliﬁed by our case study on real data, data values may not be avail-
able for some leaf nodes. In such cases, the bottom-up computation technique
is infeasible. Buldas et al. [5] have recently shown that intermediary data val-
ues can be used to complete the attack tree decoration process. Our current
theory of attack-tree series with attributes, including temperature functions, is
agnostic to the decoration process, as it only requires that all attack trees in
the time-series are decorated. We plan to further develop a more general theory
for quantitative problems on attack-tree series that will take into account data
decoration algorithms and the types of data available in threat intelligence feeds
(e.g., the number of infections).
Finally, we would like to develop a system for automatic attack-tree series de-
sign and visualization from threat intelligence feeds. Recent work [35,27,14,11,15]
demonstrated the viability of generating attack trees automatically. Particularly,
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Jhawar et al. [15] have shown that a threat library can be used to compose at-
tack trees. A well-deﬁned attack library like MITRE ATT&CK3 could be used
to automatically annotate information from threat feeds and add new relevant
attack scenarios to an existing attack-tree series.
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